In Antitrust in a World of Interrelated Economies, Mano Marques Mendes 1 provides an insightful account of the conflict between antitrust and trade policy objectives in both the United States and the European Community (EC). 2 His main contention is simple indeed: antitrust, which aims to promote competition, and trade policy, which aims to protect domestic industry, operate at cross-purposes. Mendes skillfully elaborates this thesis throughout his book, showing the reader how the two policies conflict and how the enforcers of trade policy might better recognize the concerns behind antitrust policy. His book is full of insights into policymaking and decisionmaking at all levels. Mendes traces the history of antitrust and trade enforcement in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development {UNCTAD) as adroitly as he discusses infighting between the Department of Justice and the International Trade Commission. His remarkable ability to discuss two major policies in two legal systems at once is ultimately the real strength of this book.
Mendes divides the text into three parts. The first, "International Trade and International Antitrust: An Overview," summarizes the history of trade liberalization in the GATT and trade protection despite the GATT (pp. [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] . It then reviews the history of antitrust enforcement, noting that despite its mainly economic bases, one early political motivation for enforcement stemmed from an association of cartels with Naziism (p. 34). Mendes points up the limitations of purely domestic antitrust enforcement and decries the lack of regulation of restrictive business practices on the international level. 3 discussion of the lack of international antitrust enforcement is slightly out of date in that it fails to mention the 1991 agreement between the EC and the United States to coordinate antitrust enforcement. 4 While currently in force, France is presently challenging the validity of the agreement in front of the European Court of Justice. 5 The second part of the book, "The U.S. and EEC Antitrust Systems," completes the foundation for the intricate arguments of Part Ill Mendes' taxonomy of the interrelationships relevant to his inquiry begins in this part. He skillfully addresses the practical aspects of enforcement in the U.S. and the EC before finding that "all these aspects of antitrust enforcement cannot be looked at separately. They are all interrelated" (p. 68). Mendes further notes that, especially in the U.S., antitrust is not only complex in itself but also constitutes part of a broader economic policy (p. 65). The importance of economic criteria in American antitrust evaluations cannot be underestimated, while economics plays a lesser role in Community decisionmaking. 6 Mendes goes too far, however, when he characterizes the role of ecoon the agenda of the next GATI round. He said: "An international body with powers to seek out and destroy cartels may come one day, but the international community is clearly not ready to contemplate this possibility yet. 6. Ascertaining the precise role economics will play in future competition evaluations in the EC is difficult because of the appointment this year of a new Competition Commissioner, Karel van Miert. The former Commissioner, Sir Leon Brittan, recognized the importance of economic efficiency criteria: "[O]ur approach is an economic, rather than a legal one. Competition law is rightly concerned with substance rather than form." SIR LEON BRITTAN, COMPETITION POLICY AND MERGER CONTROL IN THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET 37 (1991) . There are fears, however, that van Miert will deemphasize economics:
In anti-trust issues, Mr [.] Van Miert says, competition should. not be the only criterion: industrial, social and other factors also apply. Indeed they dci, but they are not the business [Vol. 91:1552 nomics in the EC as "minor." 7 In support of his contention, Mendes cites to the Sixth, Ninth, Thirteenth, and Sixteenth Reports on Competition Policy, but he neglects to examine more recent reports that place a greater emphasis on economic efficiency in the EC. 8 Having found the goals of antitrust to be superior to those of trade policy by virtue of their promotion of competition and free trade, Mendes defines the useful limits of domestic antitrust policy by commencing a detailed investigation of the vagaries of international subject matter jurisdiction (pp. 86-101). The foreign sovereign immunity, act-of-state, foreign sovereign compulsion, and other defenses may prevent a domestic antitrust policy from functioning effectively in the international arena (pp. 94-101). Mendes notes that where an industry can choose between bringing an antitrust suit or an import relief proceeding, it will invariably choose the latter because the antitrust defenses will not apply (p. 166).
Both legal systems tend to downplay international comity considerations. 9 Moreover, both the U.S. and the EC tend to encourage or approve antitrust violations abroad, as the U.S. statute exempting export cartels from antitrust suits illustrates. 10 A fuller discussion of the statutory exemptions to the U.S. and EC antitrust laws would have of the competition commissioner.
• . . If the result is to be a productive compromise, it is above all necessary that the competition commissioner should fight his corner. been appreciated, especially as the U.S. exemption for export cartels 11 and the EC exemption for crisis cartels 12 seem to accommodate trade policy objectives.
At this point, Mendes attempts a preliminary comparison between the U.S. and EC antitrust systems that rings true in most respects but becomes deeply problematic when he explores it further in Part III. He asserts that "[t]he concentration one finds in the Common Market is in striking opposition to the decentralized U.S. institutional and enforcement structure" (p. 82). This is surely correct. The United States has a greater arsenal of antitrust enforcement agencies and instruments, while in the EC the Commission has greater powers than the Justice Department and the F.T.C. combined. 13 Moreover, the American approach to antitrust is more deeply rooted in concerns of economic efficiency than that of the Community, with its "objective of market integration ... [as] the most important of the goals of EEC competition policy" (p. 74). Given the centralization in the EC, it is not surprising that "antitrust appears more obviously as one set of principles which has to be balanced against other equally relevant considerations" (p. 138). In the United States, the reconciliation of antitrust with other policies, such as trade, may be achieved through interagency negotiation rather than intraagency decision, as the author's explanation of the LTV-Republic merger case illustrates so well. 14 The author's logical assumptions in his preliminary comparison between the two antitrust systems in Part II lead to perplexing conclusions when applied in Part III. Mendes finds that, "at least in theory," the reconciliation of trade and antitrust should be easier in the EC 13. Seep. 82 (noting in particular that the Commission has the power to grant individual and block exemptions from the antitrust rules, and that its "notices" have greater weight than the Department of Justice's "guidelines").
14. Pp. 239-48. The LTV-Republic steel merger was originally prohibited by the Department of Justice. The Department reasoned that a merger between the third and fourth largest producers would increase concentration in the domestic market and likely lead to higher prices. [Vol. 91:1552 than the U.S. because of the centralization of power in the Commission and the fact that all EC trade laws contain "Community interest" clauses requiring the consideration of other policies and interests before adopting trade sanctions (p. 168). He goes on to find, however, that the clauses do not really work; the Commission consistently upholds the interests of industry over the interest of the public in free competition (p. 169). Mendes becomes rather irate with the Commission:
The rare cases in which it is said that competition considerations were taken into account do not show a change of attitude on the part of the Community authorities. The approach is confusing, if not puzzling; the motivation is poor, if at all existent; the inconsistencies are blatant if one compares such cases with usual analysis of EC institutions. Conversely, and strikingly enough, it is in the United States -where "public interest" clauses in trade laws are ineffective or non-existent, and where there are not only one but several agencies involved in antitrust and trade matters -that, through the efforts of the antitrust enforcement authorities, competition arguments have been regularly submitted, sometimes successfully, in trade proceedings . . . . The fact is that much more was done, in apparently a not so favorable legal and institutional environment, than in the EEC, to bridge those differences. [p. 177] Yet, in the final part of the book, Mendes inexplicably reverses his position again. The book begins to feel like a detective novel -the United States is "guilty" because it has no "public interest" clauses, too many agencies, and the common law tradition. No, actually the EC is at fault because its "Community interest" clauses have no real effect. Suddenly, on page 243, the United States is fingered again: "while in the EEC antitrust is understandably balanced against other policy concerns, any attempt to adopt the same approach in the United States ... may be unrealistic." Mendes offers little support for this last reversal. He cites several of the Commission's Reports on Competition Policy and Article 130f of the Treaty of Rome, but gives no practical "in-the-trenches" advice as before on how the system really works. 16 As a result, his conclusion sounds a little hollow: "In The impressive observations and analyses in this book illustrate how certain trade measures in each legal system contravene the policy goals of antitrust. Mendes' discussion in Part III of how each U.S. trade law -except countervailing duties -runs afoul of the antitrust laws is superb. Mendes coyly asks "whether there is any fundamental reason for applying antitrust rules and principles in domestic trade while setting them aside in what concerns foreign trade which is dealt with by the import relief laws" (p. 144), before quite convincingly showing that all the fundamental reasons point the other way. He reveals that the only kind of dumping that violates the antitrust laws is predatory dumping, which is also the least likely to occur. 17 He admits, however, that scrapping the antidumping laws is not feasible, the trade law context in the EEC -certainly not as complete and sophisticated as the one existing in the U.S. -which has been taking place (as well as the changes in the judicial structure) may end up in a greater scrutiny of the assessment made by EC institutions of the "public interest" element in trade cases, which may in due time influence the institutions' approach under that concept. P. 197 (emphasis added). given the weakness of domestic antitrust law in the international arena. He finds the escape clause, too, works against competition 18 but alleges the greatest difficulties are with section 337 of the 1930 Tariff Act, which is ironically "the one most resembling the antitrust laws and yet the most criticized for the anticompetitive concerns raised by its application. "19 Mendes' analysis of the antitrust problems arising from trade litigation in the U.S. and the EC is also compelling. He finds more similarities than differences between the two systems (pp. 193-97). Some differences persist, however, which Mendes catalogues quite elegantly. In the United States, companies tread a fine line between lobbying and unlawfully exchanging business information (pp. 179-80). Voluntary restraint and similar agreements also pose antitrust risks in the United States after the Consumers Union case, 20 while these risks are somewhat less in the Ec.21
Mendes writes the first and second parts of his book casually and compactly. They are complete enough, however, to prepare the reader for the more interesting discussion in Part III, where all of the arguments previously developed finally interrelate. Unfortunately, Part III is as brief and casual as the first two parts. The plethora of exclamation points -three on page 170 alone! -can be forgiven. The author, after all, is terribly upset about the Commission's failure to take the Community interest into account when deciding on trade sanctions. Despite being impressed by his fervor, however, after patiently reviewing the history of antitrust and trade in expectation of this final synthesis, the reader wishes to explore some of his arguments in more detail. The two page conclusion is at once simplistic and cryptic.
In the final analysis, Mendes does an extraordinarily good job of isolating the conflicts between antitrust and trade policy in the United States and the European Community, but he leaves the reader somewhat baffied as to which legal system better resolves these conflicts. He also does not explain how an international agreement might best be structured for effectiveness and acceptance. Mendes ultimately raises as many interesting questions as he answers.
-Alyssa A. Grikscheit
